Thomas Reid, Essays on the intellectual powers of man. Edinburgh: Bell, 1785 (EA).

»Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.

These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr Locke’s doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr Locke’s doctrine, he is not the perfon who was flogged. There fore the general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was flogged at school.

Leaving the confequences of this doćtrine to those who have leisure to trace them, we may observe, with regard to the doctrine itself,

First, That Mr LOCKE attributes to consciousness the conviction we have of our past actions, as if a man may now be conscious of what he did twenty years ago. It is impostible to understand the meaning of this, unless by consciousness be meant memory, the only faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of our past actions.«

Man stelle sich einen Offizier vor, der sich daran erinnert, wie er als Kind in der Schule mit Schlägen bestraft wurde, weil er in einem Obstgarten stahl, und wie er eine feindliche Flagge in seiner ersten Mission eroberte. Später als General kann er sich ebenfalls an diesen Missionserfolg erinnern, hat aber die kindliche Bestrafung vergessen. Wenn Erinnerung das Kriterium für Identität ist: kann dann der General dieselbe Person wie der Junge sein?

Reids Gedankenexperiment bezieht sich auf Lockes Theorie, dass die Identität der Person wesentlich von der Kontinuität des Bewusstseins und der Erinnerungen abhänge. Daher ergäbe sich ein Dilemma. Einerseits hat der Offizier die Erinnerungen an die Handlungen des Jungen und der General die an die des Offiziers: Junge gleich Offizier gleich General. Andererseits hätte aber der General nicht die Erinnerung an die Handlungen des Jungen, d.h. Junge nicht gleich General. Reid verwirft darum Lockes Theorie zugunsten einer der Kontinuität der Beziehung von mentalen Zuständen auf dasselbe Ich.

Enthalten in: Levy 2017, 219; Worley 2014, 100-101; Tittle 2005, 72-73.

• Reid, Thomas (1710-1796)
• Philosophie der Person
• Klassisches Gedankenexperiment